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ing the pendency of a taxpayers suit"'15 required application of
the prohibition in this instance.

PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Albert Tate, Jr.*
Few of the year's three hundred procedural decisions possess
the significance of League Central Credit Union v. Montgomery,'
which resolved a conflict in our jurisprudence concerning sales
under executory process. Nevertheless, clusters of cases indicate
development or confusion as to given points of procedural law.
This discussion will concentrate on these, for they must represent a much larger body of trial practice problems concluded
without appeal. The lack of importance of many of the undiscussed decisions is again a tribute to the procedural reform
accomplished by the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure of 1960
and to the vision of the late Dean Henry George McMahon and
the Code's other principal architects.
Two

FREQUENT MISTAKES OF PRACTITIONERS

On reading the procedural decisions of the past year, one
is struck by two errors which account for the dismissal of over
seven percent of these appeals (and of almost two percent of
all appeals).
The first and most serious concerns a misunderstanding as
to when a devolutive appeal bond must be filed. The bond must
be filed within the delay required to perfect the appeal, ninety
days after the judgment becomes final in the trial court.2 That
is, not only must the order of appeal be taken within the delay,
but also the security to perfect it must be filed within this
period. Despite this requirement of our law, in twelve instances
15. Acosta v. Board of Comm'rs of Lake Borgne Basin Levee Dist., 251 La.
798, 206 So. 2d 499 (1968).
*Presiding Judge, Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit; Special Lecturer
of Law, Louisiana State University, 1968-69. The writer acknowledges the research
and editorial assistance afforded him by Ben F. Day, Esq., Law Clerk, Court of
Appeal, Third Circuit for the 1968-69 term, and member of the East Baton Rouge
and Calcasieu Parish bars.
1. 251 La. 971, 762 So. d 655 (1968). See discussion in text at note 163 infra.
2. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2087. This provides that the order for appeal must be
obtained and the appeal bond furnished within ninety days of the denial of an
applic:tion for a new trial, or, if none, within ninety days of the expiration of the
delay to apply for a new trial.
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last year the appeal bond was filed after the delay expired 3 in
the mistaken belief apparently that, after timely securing his
order granting the appeal, the appellant need not file his bond
until the "return day" (the date fixed by the order granting
the appeal for the clerk to file the appellate record in the appellate court) .4 This mistake is fatal, for the appeal is an absolute nullity and forever lost unless the appeal bond is timely
5
filed ..
The second mistake consists of premature appeals before
the judgment is signed. A final judgment must be in writing
to be appealable.6 In eleven cases during the year 7 appeals were
taken after the trial court had only noted its decision by a
minute entry in open court or by oral or written reasons for
judgment. Dismissal on such ground is without prejudice to
perfecting a new appeal timely, after a written judgment will
3. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Cocreham, 251 La. 705, 206 So.2d 79
(1968) and eleven other decisions.
'*o this sad number must be added Bowden v. Bowden, 203 So.2d 879 (La
App. 1st Cir. 1967), where similarly the order of appeal was timely obtained within
the thirty days allowable for a judgment of separation, LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3942,
but where the bond to perfect the appeal was filed after the delay, causing the
dismissal of the appeal.
4. LA. CoDE Civ. P. art. 21.25 provides that the return day shall be fixed at
not more than sixty days from the date the appeal is granted. LA. CODE CiV. P. art.
2126 provides that tbe appellant must pay three days prior to the original or
extended return day "all costs of preparing the record on appeal, and the filing fee
required by the appellate court." (Emphasis added.) Apparently, quite a few counsel
have the mistaken impression that they can delay filing the bond until they pay
such costs and fee which tle bond is designed to secure.
5. Orrell v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. ins. Co., 248 La. 576, 180 So.2d
710 (1965).
6. Final judgments must be in writing and signed in open court. LA. CODE CIV.
P. arts. 1911, 1918. Only final judgments are appealable with the exception of interlocutory judgments causing irreparable injury. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2083. It is
to be noted that there is no requirement for interlocutory judgments to he signed
or in writing, so interlocutory judgments causing irreparable injury iay be appealed although formalized only by minute entry. Cf., Doug Ashy .umber, Inc. v.
Simon, 1.77 So.2d 182 (La App. 3d Cir. 1965).
7. See e.g. Broyles v. Broyles, 209 So.2d 60 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968), and
Forman v. May, 201 So.2d 683 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
The reasons for the requirement tbat a final judgment be expressly so identified and be a separate document from the reasons for judgment, LA. CODE CIV.
P. art. 1918, are discussed in Abramson v. Piazza, 1)8 So.2d 565 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1967), where on original hearing the appeal was dismissed. In that case,
however, after the original opinion, the record was supplemented on appeal,
LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2132, to show that indeed a final judgment lad beeu signed
before tle appeal was taken. Rehearing was granted, and the appeal wias decided
on its merits.
In Broyles v. Broyles, supra, it is pointed out that, after a new trial is
granted, a final judgment in writing should be signed to dispose of the Case on
rehearing; and in Forman v. 3lay, supra, the court held ineffectual an attempt
to save the appeal by supplementing the record with a final judgment signed after
the appeal had been perfected.
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be signed by the trial court, so the error is curable.8 Nevertheless, the delay to the client, the loss of lawyer-time, and the
addition to appellate traffic are completely unnecessary when
caused by inattention to this formality.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

In 1964 the Louisiana legislature enacted the Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Act. 9 The reasons leading to its
enactment, chiefly the expanding interaction of our economy
and the increasingly migratory tendency of Americans, were
noted by Dean McMahon in his last four faculty symposia. 10 The
past year saw five decisions, four of which tended to shape the
boundaries of judicial application of the principle embodied by
the act-roughly to permit exercise of personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents in transactions with sufficient contact with this
state so that "the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.""
Two of these decisions note that the mere fact that a nonresident does business with a forum resident does not justify the
forum's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him: for instance,
if the nonresident executes a note at his domicile payable to the
resident of the forum, this by itself does not justify the forum's
entertaining a personal suit against the nonresident ;1 or again,
if the nonresident becomes indebted to a Louisiana resident, the
mere fact of this business indebtedness and Louisiana-based
demand letters do not justify the exercise by Louisiana of personal jurisdiction."' There must be something more, some actual
or symbolic entry into Louisiana by which the nonresident "purposefully avails itself [himself] of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
8. A party might, however, lose his right of appeal if he secured an order of
appeal and later obtained a signed final judgment. In such instance, the prejudgment appeal is a nullity, and following the genuine judgment the delay for
perfecting the appeal commences to run and might expire before perfection of a valid
(second) appeal. See Forman v. May, 201 So.2d 683 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1.967)
(appeal dismissed), 202 So.2d 685 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967) (timely valid subsequent appeal decided). But see Mossler Acceptance Co. v. Moiliere, 181 So. 228
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938).
9. LA. R.S. 13:3201-07 (1950), added by La. Acts 1964, No. 47, § 3. See
Comment, 26 LA. L. REV. 350 (1966) ; Comment, 40 TUL. L. REV. 366 (1966).
10. See discussions in faculty symposia. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts-Civil Procedure,as follows: for the year 1964-65 at 26 LA. L. REV.
581-84 (1966) ; for 1963-64, at 25 LA. L. REV. 433-35 (1965) ; for 1962-63, at
24 LA. L. REV. 293 (1964) ; for the year 1961-62, 23 LA. L. REV. 378-80 (1963).
11. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
12. Moore v. Evans, 196 So.2d 839 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
13. Bowlero, Inc. v. Allen, 205 So.2d 196 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967).
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and protection of its laws.' ' 14 Typically, this minimum contact
justifying personal jurisdiction over resultant litigation can be
by some act or acts within the state, such as in Terasse v.
Wisconsin Feeder Pig Marketing Co-Op.1- The nonresident defendant had furnished a Louisiana broker a price list for cows.
The Louisiana plaintiff ordered some cows from the broker,
paying ten percent down. The cattle were delivered to Louisiana from Wisconsin in a truck not owned by the defendant
vendor with the remaining ninety percent of the price paid
then. The court properly held there were sufficient contacts to
justify holding the seller 0 subject to personal jurisdiction in
Louisiana tort litigation arising out of this commercial transaction.
A closer case is presented by Aucoin v. Hanson.17 There, a
Louisiana plaintiff sought to recover the purchase price of a
defective mare bought from a Mississippi seller. In upholding
jurisdiction, the majority applied a provision of the "long-arm"
statute based upon the nonresident's "transacting any business"
in Louisiana.-8 The facts relied upon were that the Louisiana
buyer had been first interested in the purchase of the Mississippi mare and first quoted a price by a Louisiana horse trainer
who had formerly worked for the Mississippi seller and who
apparently communicated the Louisiana buyer's interest to him.
Although the only direct contact of the seller with Louisiana
was by one or two long-distance calls placed by the Louisiana
buyer, the majority to some extent relied upon non-related Louisiana horse-racing and horse-breeding activities of the Mississippian. A forceful and persuasive dissent disputed the majority's factual findings and also denied that, if proved, they
justified personal jurisdiction over the nonresident. Nevertheless, fully admitting reasonable minds may differ and that
possibly this pushes long-arm jurisdiction to the outer limit
of its permissibility, the writer views the Mississippi business14. lanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
15. 202 So.2d 330 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967). The decision 'based personal
jurisidiction, not upon "long-arm statute," La. R.S. 13:3201-3207 (1950), but
instead upon a similar provision permitting jurisdiction over foreign corporations
in litigation resulting from "a business activity" in the state, Id. 13:3471 (1)
(1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 1.
16. It should be noted that a seller in a business transaction may :be regarded
as having sufficient contact, within contemporary notions, to justify the subsequent exercise of personal jurisdiction over him, but that a nonresident buyer
may be considered as not purposefully availing himself of the forum laws so as
to be doing business in the state. Cf. J. Perez, S.A. v. Louisiana Rice Growers,
Inc., 139 So.2d 247 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
17. 207 So.2d 834 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
18. LA. R.S. 13:3201 (a) (1964).
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man as having purposefully invoked the protection of Louisiana
law for the business transaction by selling the mare for delivery
to a Louisiana buyer, especially if one considers that the initial
Louisiana-based negotiations arose out of the defendant's general
business activities. This is a concept incorporated in the section
of our long-arm statute basing jurisdiction over a nonresident
for a cause of action arising from "contracting to supply services or things in this state." 19 (Emphasis added.) The Louisiana contacts of this commercial transaction were purposeful
on the part of the seller; within contemporary notions it was not
unfair to subject him to a Louisiana suit, when he contemplated
the delivery of the mare into Louisiana with consequent possible invocation of Louisiana law in aid of the transaction (as
for instance, a possible Louisiana collection suit). In this regard,
it is immaterial whether he personally came to Louisiana to
negotiate or did so by telephone, or whether he shipped the
mare into Louisiana or merely delivered it in Mississippi for
the Louisiana buyer to bring it home.
On the other hand, it is appropriate to note that, while the
supplier may be subjected to personal jurisdiction, different
policy considerations are at play in determining whether it is
fair similarly to subject the consumer or buyer to foreign suits.
The buyer did not contemplate any use of the laws or judicial
machinery of his nonresident seller's domiciliary state. Within
contemporary notions of fairness, litigation concerning the
transaction should not be excepted from the general rule of suit
in a defendant's home state, for there was no purposeful invocation of the benefits and protection of the foreign law and judicial machinery. Thus the long-arm statute expressly provides that
one who contracts anywhere to supply services or things in Louisiana shall be subject to personal jurisdiction in Louisiana
litigation arising from the transaction," but it does not contain
a similar attempt to exercise personal jurisdiction of one elsewhere who contracts to obtain or buy things for shipment from
Louisiana. Also, while the statute provides for jurisdiction in
causes of action arising out of "transacting any business in this
state,"" traditionally a seller may be "doing business" while
a buyer (consumer) may not.2 2 This limitation in long-arm
19. LA. R.S. 13:3201 (b) (1964). See Comment, 26 LA. L. REv. 372, 379-85
(1966), Comment, 40 TUL. L. REv. 366, 381-84 (1966).
20. Id.
21. LA. R.S. 13:3201 (a) (1964).
22. J. Perez, S.A. v. Louisiana Rice Growers, Inc., .139 So.2d 247 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962) ; Annot., A.L.R.2d 1439 (1950).
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jurisdiction may perhaps soothe the viewer-with-alarm who envisages mail-order consumers being haled to distant courts to
defend claims against them for minsicule amounts. Thus, what's
fair for the goose (seller) may not be fair for the gander (consumer) under modern conditions of commerce. Unlike nonresident consumers, interstate suppliers may be in a position to
defend suits against them in jurisdictions into which they ship
their products, or at least should accept this risk as an incident
of interstate commerce where goods are purposefully sent to the
foreign jurisdiction for a price (which should anticipate covering this and other usual expenses of doing business).
A long-arm venue problem was touched on in Lavergne v.
Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. 13 Louisiana plaintiffs were
injured in an accident in Terrebonne Parish. They sued the
Tennessee driver, and also his liability insurer who had issued
the policy in Tennessee and was not authorized to do business
in Louisiana. The suit was brought at the plaintiffs' domicile
in Vermilion Parish, one of the venues authorized by the longarm act.2 4 The insurer's exception of improver venue was sustained by the trial court in dismissing the suit. The court of
appeal correctly pointed out that a foreign insurer's issuance of
a policy outside of the state to a nonresident does not subject the
insurer to jurisdiction under the Louisiana Jurisdiction over
Nonresidents Act.2 5' Thus, while the nonresident driver had sufficient contact with Louisiana through his tortious act here,
Louisiana had no personal jurisdiction over his insurer since it
did not have the requisite statutory contact with this state.
The Lavergne decision is of greater interest because of its
23. 208 So.2d 562 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
24. LA. R.S. 13:3203 Supp. (1964) provides for the plaintiff's venue as one of
the authorized venues under the act.
25. LA. R.S. .13:3201 (1950) defines the minimum contacts giving rise to
personal jurisdiction in actions arising out of them. It does not include issuing
an insurance policy to someone who might happen to travel to Louisiana.
The Louisiana Non-resident Motorist Act, LA. R.S. 13:3474, 3475 (.1950),
as amended by La. Acts 1956, No. 138, provides that the operation of a motor
vehicle within the state by a non-resident shall be equivalent to his appointment
of the Louisiana Secretary of State to be agent for service of process upon himself and upon his casualty insurer in suits growing out of Louisiana accidents.
This provision has been criticized as being unconstitutional, when jurisdiction is
sought over a foreign insurer which did not sell or deliver the policy in Louisiana
nor consent to such direct action by securing authorization to do business here.
Sarpy, Survey of 1956 Louisiana Legislation- Practice and Procedure, 17 LA. L.
REv. 45, 47-50 (1960). On the other hand, Dean McMahon believed it to be a not
unconstitutional requirement. McMahon, Legislative Symposium: the 1958 Regular
Session-Courts and Civil Procedure, 19 LA. L. REV. 72, 74-76 (1958). See Pugh
v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 159 F.Supp. 155 (D.C. La. 1958). In
the subject case, however, no attempt was made to assert jurisdiction over the
defendant by virtue of the non-resident motorist statute.
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26
venue issue. Assuming that Louisiana's direct action statute
applied to this suit against the insurer, the court affirmed the
sustaining of an exception pleading improper venue. The court
pointed out that the direct action statute provides that such
suits against insurers may be brought "in the parish in which
the accident or injury occurred or in the parish in which an
action could be brought either against the insured or the liability insurer under the general rules of venue prescribed by Article
42, Code of Civil Procedure, ' 27 to-wit, in Terrebonne 2s or East
Baton Rouge. 29 If the result is correct,30 the language is subject
to objection for implying that direct action suits may never be
brought at other than these venues authorized by the direct action statute. If the direct action suit against the insurer is properly cumulated with an action against a joint or solidary
obligor, it may also be brought in any parish of proper venue
under Article 42 as to any other solidary obligor3l-for example,
had a joint tortfeasor domiciled in Vermilion been joined as
codefendant, the venue would be proper in that parish (proper
as a venue against the latter, Article 42), even though it is not

26. LA. R.S. 23:655 (1950), as amended 'by La. Acts 1962, No. 471. Actually,
the act applies to policies issued or delivered in Louisiana, or, if issued outside
the state, by insurers authorized to do business in the state who consent to be
sued by direct action in suits arising out of accidents in Louisiana. l.A. R.S.
22:983 (E) (1950), as re-enacted by La. Acts 1958, No. 125; Webb v. Zurich
Ins. Co., 251 La. 558, 205 So.2d 398 (1967). See also LA. R.S. 22:1253 (1950).
However, the Louisiana Non-resident Motorist Act provides that the casualty
insurer of non-resident motorists causing injury while using Louisiana highways
may be sued through service on the Louisiana Secretary of State. LA. 1.S. 13:3474
(1950) as amended by La. Acts 1956, No. 318, § 1. A federal court has held that
the right of direct action created by LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950) may be enforced
against foreign insurers over whom jurisdiction is obtained by virtue of the nonresident motorist statute, despite the circumstance that the insurer is not authorized to do business in Louisiana and that the policy was not issued or delivered
here. Pugh v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 159 F. Supp. 155 (D.C. la.
1958). The decision's holding is based upon Louisiana's governmental interest in
providing compensation for Louisiana traffic victims, the requisite minimum contacts and reasonable notice, and the lack of substantive prejudice to the foreign
insurer by enlargement of any liabilities under the policy.
27. LA. R.S. 22:665 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1962, No. 471.
28. I.e., the place of the accident.
29. I.e., the place of statutory domicile of a foreign insurer, LA. CODE CIv.
P. art. 42(7) as amended by La. Acts 1961, No. 23, § 1.
30. The codefendant insured, as a non-resident, could under the Code be
properly sued in "a parish where the process may 'be, and subsequently is, served
on the defendant." LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 42(5), as amended by La. Acts 1961,
No. 23, § 1.
Under the long-arm statute, service of process can be made by either mailing
it to the non-resident or else by having it served upon him outside the state.
LA. R.S. 13:3204 (Supp. 1964). Since the service contemplated is the actual
receipt by the non-resident of the process, LA. R.S. 13:3205 (1965), probably the
mailing of process in Vermilion Parish would not be service upon the non-resident
there, so as to permit the invocation of the Code provision permitting joinder in
the Vermilion Parish suit of actions against other solidary obligors suable there
under Article 42. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 73.
31. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 73.
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one of the venues authorized by the direct-action statute for
suits against the insurer alone. The court's implication to the
contrary was of course inadvertent, since the question was not
before it. Nevertheless, the venue holding significantly points
up that, when suits are brought against defendants by virtue
of long-arm or other special statutes, any venue provisions must
be checked and correlated with those proper for other defendants joined; for actions may not be properly cumulated against
plural defendants, unless the venue is proper as to each of
3
them. Transfers to Another Venue
Prior to the 1960 Code, on timely objection to improper venue
the court was required to dismiss the action. However, Article
121 of the new Code provided that in such an instance the court
could also "in the interest of justice transfer it [the action]
to a court of proper venue." The Code contemplates that or33
dinarily the action should be transferred rather than dismissed.
The only other provision of the Code permitting transfer to another venue is Article 122, which permits transfer upon proof
that the party seeking it cannot obtain an impartial trial because of undue influence of his opponent, prejudice, or other
like cause. In the year under review were decided the first cases
relating to the scope of the venue-transfer power and the reviewability of transfer orders.
Trahan v. Phoenix Ins. Co.3 4 rejected an attempt to deduce
from these venue-transfer articles the power to transfer a suit
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. A direct action was
brought against a foreign insurer at its statutory domicile in
East Baton Rouge Parish. At the instance of the defendant, the
trial court transferred the cause to Beauregard Parish, a forum
much more convenient to the parties and the court. Nevertheless,
the court of appeal granted certiorari and reversed. The court
correctly held that the sole statutory grounds for changes of
venue were set forth by Articles 121 and 122 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and that neither provision authorized transfer
from a venue because of the inconvenience of trial there. The
court's well-reasoned opinion held that in the absence of legislation, the doctrine of forum non conveniens will not be applied
in this state. Noting also that the Supreme Court had denied
32. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 463.
33. LA. CODE CIV. 1'. art. 932, comment (b).
34. 200 So.2d 118 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967), writs refused, 251 La. 47, 202
So.2d 657 (1967).
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certiorari in Trahan, a subsequent decision of the same circuit
reached a similar result.8 5 In denying certiorari as to this second
decision also, the high court tersely noted: "Applicant's remedy
is by legislation. ' '"
Transfer instead of dismissal for improper venue was
designed to facilitate the disposition of litigation. However, what
if the trial court erroneously transfers a suit? Review after trial
might be an empty remedy, since the opponent of an erroneous
transfer might not wish to re-try the case. On the other hand,
the general policy of our law forbids sporadic review of interlocutory orders issued during the course of litigation 3 and abhors
piecemeal appeals on fragmented issues. 38 Further, to permit
appeal as of right of venue transfer orders opens up to a determined defendant an avenue for harassing dilatory tactics.
In one case this term, both facets of the problem were considered in seriatim in the litigation's double appearance at the
appellate level. In the first appearance of Broussard v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co.,39 the court dismissed an appeal from a judgment
transferring the cause from Vermilion to Iberia Parish. In
the writer's view, the court correctly held that the appeal was
interlocutory and violated the policy against piecemeal appeal.
Nevertheless, as the court pointed out, a contrary result could
have been based upon earlier decisions 49 holding to be appealable,
as causing irreparable injury, an order transferring a case from
state to federal court or an order refusing to transfer a case
from one judge to another judge upon a plea for recusation.
The court noted that an appropriate remedy for interlocutory
review would be by application to the court's supervisory jurisdiction. Accepting the hint, the plaintiff obtained supervisory writs, and the court then held, on the litigation's second
appellate appearance, 41 that the trial court had erroneously
transferred the case. The writer believes that the court's resolution of the venue-transfer issues is sensible and correct. It
35. Chaney v. Williher, 205 So.2d 770 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
36. 251 La. 940, 207 So.2d 541 (1968).
37. LA. CODE Civ. P'. art. 2083.
38. ,See e.g., Bettencourtt v. Boyd, 209 So.2d 339 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
In this case the court refused to review a trial court judgment which had decided
the issue of tort liability alone, leaving for future determination the qualntum
of damages. The court discusses the code articles requiring the appellate refusal
to review an interlocutory judgment; it remanded the case for full trial on the
merits and final trial court judgment deciding it.
39. 204 So.2d 714 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
40. They are discussed in State v. Reid, 115 La. 959, 40 So. 369 (1906).
41. Broussard v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 210 So.2d 411 (La. App. 3d Cir.

1968).
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prevents dilatory misuse by appeal as of right, in violation of our
policy against fragmentary adjudication; but at the same time
it affords a practical and expeditious method to review erroneous
venue-transfer orders.
The second Broussard proper-venue ruling also possesses
significance. The Vermilion plaintiffs had purchased cattle feed
from the Iberia defendants. The plaintiffs fed their registered
bull this feed in Vermilion, and the bull died, allegedly from
poisonous feed. Suit was instituted in Vermilion, the place where
the damages were sustained,'4 upon the theory that the wrong
resulted from a tort. The trial court held that this products
liability case should be properly venued as if for a breach of
contract (warranty), i.e., at the defendant's domicile in Iberia.
The appellate court held that a suit for damages caused by a
product defect can properly be based either on negligence or in
contract, so that either venue is proper. The trial court's transfer
order was reversed. This, of course, is in accord with the settled
view that a breach of contract may give rise to both an action
in tort as well as an action in contract, at the election of the
plaintiff.' 3 The ruling will afford procedural guidance in the
expanding field of products liability litigation.
PLEADINGS

The Exception: Res Judicata
A group of the year's decisions concerned the peremptory
exception pleading of res judicata. 44 This objection's purpose is
to bar re-litigation of a matter once decided. In Louisiana, Civil
Code Article 2286 provides the statutory basis for res judicata.
By this provision, before the later suit may be barred by res
judicata there must be identity between it and the earlier suit
(a) of the parties and the qualities in which they sue, (b) of the
objects of the demands, and (c) of the causes of action. Under
civil law doctrine, all doubts as to concurrence of the identities
must be resolved in favor of maintaining the subsequent action.4 5 While these general principles are accepted, their ap42. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 74.
43. Lafleur v. Brown, 223 La. 976, 67 So.2d 556 (1953) ; Davis v. LeBlanc,
149 So.2d 252 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963). See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1956-57 Term-Civil Procedure, 18 LA. L. REV. 111-12 (1957).
44. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 927(2).
45. Quinette v. Delhommer, 247 La. 1121, 176 So.2d 399 (1965). There are
certain limited historical exceptions to the required identity of causes of action
to those actually pleaded (to include also those which might have been pleaded in
connection with the transaction or situation first sued upon), which are summarized by Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La. 76, 75 So.2d 14 (1954).
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plication is not free from doubt and varying interpretation.
Dean McMahon once remarked, in fact, that "If there is anything in Louisiana which is not res judicata, it is the subject
of res judicata itself. ' ' 4 G Further confusion is afforded by the
related doctrine of judicial estoppel, by which a party may be
estopped from re-litigating an issue fully tried previously, despite
the technical lack of the triple identities required for res
judicata. 4 This common-law doctrine, in modified form, may4 s or
may not 4 9 apply in Louisiana. (The similarly-purposed doctrine
of the "law of the case," by which for reasons of efficiency a
tribunal will not ordinarily re-examine its earlier ruling on the
same issue,"0 was also applied during the year.5 1)
The decisions this year cover the gamut of res judicata problems. Thus, since strict identity of parties suing in the same ca2
pacity in both suits is required before res judicata will apply,5
a husband's suit in tort for his wife's medical expenses was
held not barred by his wife's previous unsuccessful action against
the same tortfeasor.5 3 Where in fact the cause of action and
demand are asserted by the same party in the same capacity, a
subsequent suit will be barred even though the allegations of
the second suit attempt to assert the party's claim in a dif46. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1957-58 Term-Civil
Procedure, 19 LA. L. REv. 390 (1959).
47. During the year the doctrine was referred to in Johnson v. Fid. & Cas.
Co., 201 So.2d 177, 180 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967), which refused to apply it to
bar a suit by a husband for his wife's medical expenses, although his wife's previous suit against the defendant in federal court had resulted in a jury verdict
absolving that defendant of liability in the accident. The decision quoted from
Shell Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 176 So.2d 692 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1965), which contains a full discussion of the doctrine and its ramifications with
regard to the effect of federal adjudication on subsequent state litigation. In the
latter decision, the appellate court overruled exceptions based upon res judicata
and judicial estoppel, and it remanded the case for trial on the merits. During the
year, judgment in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed, with the court refusing to
reconsider its previous holding (the law of the case) that judicial estoppel did not
bar the claim. 210 So.2d 554 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968). The Supreme Court denied
writs. 214 So.2d 165 (La. 1968).
48. Williams v. Marioneaux, 240 La. 713, 124 So.2d 919 (1960) ; Shell Oil
Co. v. Texas Transmission Corp., 176 So.2d 692, 696-97 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
49. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1960-61 Term-Civil
Procedure, 22 LA. L. REv. 374-75 (1962) ; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1957-58 Term-Civil Procedure, 388, 390-93 (1959).
50. Keller v. Thompson, 134 So.2d 395 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
51. Shell Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Co., 210 So.2d 554 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1968), discussed at note 46 supra.
52. Quinette v. Delhommer, 247 La. 1121, 176 So.2d 399 (1965). This decision notes a successor of or one privy with a party in the prior litigation is
also bound by the prior litigation, except for forced heirs who cannot be bound
by the juridical acts of their ancestor in derogation of their legitime.
53. Johnson v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 201 So.2d 177 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1967).
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ferent capacity.5 4 Likewise, where the same factual transaction
and the same theory of liability and defense are involved, the
second suit will not be exempted from res judicata by its alleging
differently (quantum meruit instead of contract) the ground of
recovery.55 When a declaratory judgment is sought, the action
may be dismissed despite the theoretical difference in the demand
from an earlier action, if the object of the demand is the same
in both proceedings; the Fourth Circuit so held, in barring a
widow's declaratory action against the executor for recognition
of certain claims, where previously the same claims had been
rejected when asserted by the widow's opposition to the executor's tableau of distribution.5G On the other hand, res judicata
founded on a foreign judgment does not bar a Louisiana suit
where the judgment is collaterally attacked as void for lack of
jurisdiction.5 7 A previous suit dismissed on exception or motion
for insufficiency of allegation does not bar a second suit on the
same claim ;58 but, when the allegations of the second suit set
forth (although in different language) the identical cause of
action and demand, it is barred by a first suit dismissed on an
exception for failure of its allegations to set forth a cause of
action.5 9
In Heine v. Muse,"( , a purchaser sued to recover the price and
damages on the ground of alleged misrepresentation by his
vendor. Earlier, the seller had sued for and obtained a default
judgment for the balance of the purchase price. The court held
that res judicata barred the second suit. In the court's analysis,
54. Gordon Fin. Corp. v. T. & R. Demolishing & Constr. Co., 200 So.2d 64
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1967) (a mortgagee brought the first suit as owner for damage to the movables, but the suit was dismissed since the creditor had no right
of action; the second suit on essentially the same ground was held barred by res
judicata, although correctly alleging this time the plaintiff's capacity as mortgagee instead of as owner).
55. Black v. Meadowview Homes Inc., 201 So.2d 218 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967).
56. Succession of Daste, 210 So.2d 521 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968). An action
for a declaratory judgment is regarded as identical to an action for specific relief
upon the same cause of action. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1871, comment.

57. Gay v. Gay, 203 So.2d 379 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967). The court held that
under Boudreaux v. Welch, 249 La. 983, 192 So.2d 356 (1966), the Florida judgment was open to collateral attack in Louisiana only if it could similarly be collaterally attacked in Florida. In holding that the case must be remanded for
proof of Florida law because the appellate court could not take judicial notice of
Florida law, the opinion overlooked the new requirement of LA. CODE CIV. P. art.

1391: "Every court of this state shall take judicial notice of the common law
and statutes of every state, territory, and other jurisdiction of the United
States ..
" (Emphasis added.)
58. Callendar v. Marks, 185 La. 948, 171 So. 86 (1936) ; F. Miller & Sons,
Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 161 So.2d 349 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
59. Duke v. Gregory Salisbury & Co., 205 So.2d 858 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967)
Gordon Fin. Corp. v. T. & R. Demolishing & Constr. Co., 200 So.2d 64 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1967).
60. 206 So.2d 529 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
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the requisite triple identity was met, as follows: (a) the parties
were obviously the same in both suits; (b) the cause (or cause
of action) was the same, since each suit was founded upon the
same juridical or material facts, i.e., those surrounding the confection of the agreement to sell; and (c) the thing demanded
was the same, i.e., the validity of the sale as asserted by the first
suit and the denial of its validity as asserted by the second suit.
The court concluded that "any exception which plaintiff-appellant might have urged [in the foreclosure suit] against the
validity of the sale is forever barred whether asserted in the
form of an affirmative defense or by an action brought for that
purpose." 1
The opinion is thoughtful and shows scholarly research. It
is nevertheless open to serious objection. In the first place, the
language quoted revives the common-law doctrine that a judgment is conclusive not only of what was pleaded, but also of
what might have been pleaded. The jurisprudence was formerly
divided on the question, but a decided preponderance of modern
Louisiana decisions reject this common-law view. With exceptions not here material, they hold that the judgment is conclusive only as to matters put in issue by the pleadings and actually
decided.62 In fact, the decisions cited in Heine v. Muse to support the criticized statement are among those referred to as
enunciating the common-law doctrine now repudiated by the
modern Louisiana view.3
Nevertheless, the court is to be commended for referring to
Planiol in Heine v. Muse as an aid in its interpretation of Article 2286. The Louisiana code article is directly derived from
Article 1351 of the French Civil Code, and the opinions of the
61. Id. at 532.
62. See, e.g., Hayes v. Muller, 248 La. 934, 183 So.2d 310 (1966) ; Quinette
v. Delhommer, 247 La. 1121, 176 So.2d 399 (1965) ; Tucker v. New Orleans
Laundries, Inc., 238 La. 208, 114 So.2d 866 (1959). The modern decisions which
summarized the division of the former jurisprudence and settled the question are
Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La. 76, 75 So.2d 14 (1954) ; Hope v. Madison, 194 La. 337,
193 So. 666 (1940) ; Succession of Marinoni, 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797 (1935).
All three opinions rely upon the analysis in the leading decision by Justice Provosty, State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902).
Of great doctrinal importance also is the authoritative and perceptive study by
the late Claude O'Quin, then a student: Comments, 2 LA. L. REv. 347 (1940),
and 2 LA. L. REV. 491 (1940).
63. Succession of Whitner, 165 La. 769, 116 So. 180 (1928); Harvin v.
Blackman, 121 La. 431, 46 So. 525 (1908) ; Ludeling v. Chaffee, 40 La.Ann. 645,
4 So. 586 (1888). All three of these are cited as among those containing the
heretical common-law view contrary to the civilian doctrine. See Comment, 2 LA.
L. Rav. 491, 497-98 (1940).
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French commentators are of persuasive weight.6 4 It is submitted, however, that the court's analysis of the identity of the
causes was in error.6 5 The underlying consideration for applying res judicata is that a court did previously decide the issue:
Article 2286 provides that "The authority of the thing adjudged
takes place only with respect to what was the object of the
judgment." (Emphasis added.) In the decision under discussion,
the first suit by the seller against the purchaser may have necessarily adjudicated the amount due as the thing demanded and
the validity of the sale, as the cause asserted. Thus res judicata
might bar a second suit by the purchaser, if by it he claimed

that the amount recovered was excessive or that he had never
bought the property.66 The present second suit, however, did not
assert a cause necessarily adjudicated in the first. The purchaser
alleged he had bought the property as commercial property and
used it for commercial purposes until a fire destroyed the
building. After the fire, he sought to rebuild for commercial
64. See Comments, 2 LA. L. REv. 347, 353 (1940) and 2 LA. L. REV. 491, 524
(1940). The writer notes that Pothier was the source of the French concepts and
that he synthesized them from the Roman jurisconsults.
0 5. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2286 (1870) provides that the demand must be founded
on the same "cause of action," repeating an 1825 English mistranslation; the
French provision required that the demand should be founded on the same "cause."
Comment, 2 LA. L. REV. 491, 492, 510-11 (1940). While the common-law "cause
of action" in this context refers to rights of action founded upon certain facts as
asserted by the plaintiff, the French cause is much broader; it includes as well
the defenses to the juridical or material fact upon which the plaintiff's cause is
based. Id. See 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE no. 54A(6) (La. St. L. Inst.
transl. 1959). However, if the defense is based upon another juridical fact (e.g.,
fraud instead of incapacity, in a suit to annul a written instrument), then this
is a different cause than that asserted in the first suit. Id. Since the modern authorities cited in note 02 supra emphasizes that our Article 2286 was intended to
incorporate the French concepts, probably the preferable view is that the article
requires identity of cause in the French sense.
66. The identity or not of the thing demanded is sometimes easily ascertained.
Thus, for lack of the requisite identity, a former successful suit for specific performance does not bar a subsequent suit for damages occasioned by the same
failure not to take title timely (the cause of action assumed to be the same).
Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La. 76, 75 So.2d 14 (1954). But what if the first suit were
unsuccessful, because the court sustained a defense that the agreement to sell
was not binding? Could a second suit for damages occasioned by the failure to
deliver (in accordance with the same agreement to sell) also be regarded as demanding a different thing, and so likewise be exempted from res judicata's application? In this instance, the correct analysis might be that the "thing" demanded
by the seller's defense was a declaration of the nullity of the agreement to sell,
with the juridical facts surrounding this contention constituting the cause. Therefore, the dismissal of the first suit sustaining this defense might bar further litigation between the parties as to the object of its judgment, i.e., the holding that
the agreement to sell was not binding. Determining the identity or not of the
thing demanded is thus sometimes difficult. See 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE
no. 54A(5) (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959). In this regard, Pothier states: "I am
also held to demand the same thing, which was before in judgment, when I demand any thing issuing from it, and which could only belong to me, so far as the
thing from which it issued would have done so." 1 POTHIER, OBLIGATIONS
pt. IV, ch. 3, § 3[43], at 494 (Evans transl. 1826).
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purposes, but a building permit was denied him because of zoning restrictions which for the first time he discovered. In this
second suit, the purchaser alleged misrepresentation by the seller
and sought to recover the purchase price paid and damages. The
cause or cause of action asserted by the second suit is based upon
misrepresentation, an issue which was not actually or implicitly
adjudicated in the first suit. In the writer's view, therefore, the
causes of the two suits differ, so res judicata does not apply,
taking into consideration the civilian view that doubts must be
resolved against depriving a party of his day to litigate issues
not actually presented by earlier proceedings.
Motions: Contradictory or Ex Parte
By Article 963, an order cannot be granted without a contradictory hearing when it requires "supporting proof" or is "one
to which the mover is not clearly entitled. ' ' 67 Thus, a dismissal of
an action for failure to post a bond or a pre-trial brief was
correctly reversed, where the record did not reveal prior notice
and hearing upon the mover's motion. ' 6 Although it might be
argued that the failure to post bond and to file the pre-trial
brief were matters which did not require supporting proof, the
better view is that the opponent should be given a hearing to
contest the requirement or his failure to comply with it (his
brief might have been misfiled, etc.) before such a drastic
order as dismissal of his suit, and also simple fairness thus
dictates.
For these reasons, the court erroneously affirmed the ex
parte dismissal of a mandamus suit in State ex rel. Sylvester v.
Pitre.69 The decisions relied upon, where appeals were declared
moot because of the expiration of time or for other cause, are
not really in point, for in them a hearing by brief or argument
had been afforded. Although the defendant had filed certain
reports purporting to comply with demand of the mandamus
suit, he was not entitled to an ex parte dismissal of the plaintiff's action, since supporting proof was required to verify the
filing of reports compliant with the demand.
The Answer: Affirmative Defenses
Our Code provides that affirmative defenses must be expressly pleaded.70 Since Louisiana retains fact pleading, the
67. See Comment, 28 LA. L. REV. 552 (1968).

68. Bordelon v. X-L Fin. Co., 209 So.2d 752 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
69. 209 So.2d 764 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
70. LA. CODE CO. P. art. 1005.
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material facts constituting an affirmative defense must be
pleaded. 71 Under the strict application of this pleading theory,
therefore, the affirmative defense of "contributory negligence"
will not be considered if pleaded only as a legal conclusion without supporting facts.7 2 Similarly, a court may disregard an affirmative defense only vaguely indicated and not pleaded with
sufficient particularity.7

Since the primary purpose of the requirement that affirma74
tive defenses be pleaded is to give fair notice to the adversary,
such an overstrict application of the fact-pleading rule seems
to stress mechanics at the expense of function, at least where
the opposing party clearly understands the nature of the defense sought to be proved. This technical application is based
entirely upon pre-Code jurisprudence. To the writer, it seems
to overlook Article 1154 of the new Code, which provides that
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised by the pleading. . .

."

(Em-

phasis added.) Encouragingly, at least three appellate decisions
during the past year took this approach,' 75 although surprisingly none of them cited Article 1154. Of these, the most noteworthy is Roberts v. Meche. 76 The court here held contributory
negligence to be sufficiently pleaded, though only by legal conclusion, where the factual allegations clearly indicated that a
defense of this nature was urged. The decision is so sensible
and so much in accord with the spirit and intent of the Code
that it is surprising to find that its holding stands alone and
is contrary to the great weight of jurisprudential authority.
Of course, if objection is made when evidence is sought to
be introduced to prove an affirmative defense not pleaded, the
court may not consider this defense unless the opponent ob71. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 854, 1003; LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1154, comment
(c).
72. Landry v. Yarbrough, 199 So.2d 377 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
73. Strahan v. Delta General Constr. Corp., 207 So.2d 863 (La. App. 4th

Cir. 1968).
74. 1A BARRON & HOLrTZoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 279 (Wright

ed. 1960).
75. Olympic Homes, Inc. v. Ory, 207 So.2d 258 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968)
Roberts v. Meche, 204 So.2d 592 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967) ; Gallagher v. Taylor,
203 So.2d 773 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967).

76. 204 So.2d 592 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967). The writer's only criticism of this
opinion is that it did not mention and forthrightly overrule prior decisions of the
same circuit, such as Christ v. State, 161 So.2d 322 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964),

writs refused, 246 La. 82, 163 So.2d 358 (1964).
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tains leave to and does amend his pleadings. 7 7 What is and
what is not an affirmative defense which must be expressly
78
pleaded is a tricky, conceptual, and largely historical question.
The Fourth Circuit was on firm ground when it correctly held,
in opposition to the holding of another circuit7 9 that "sudden
emergency" is not an affirmative defense which the defendant
is required to plead in his answer.80
Incidental Actions: The Intervention
Article 1091 of the 1960 Code broadened the right of third
persons to intervene in pending litigation. The Code specifically
abandoned the former test, by which a third person could not
intervene in a pending suit unless he was to obtain immediate
gain or suffer immediate loss by the judgment on the principal
demand. Substituted for it was a test whereby a third person
having a justiciable right related to or connected with the
object of the principal suit might enforce it through intervention."' Two decisions during the past year are plainly erroneous
in refusing to permit intervention in accordance with this
broadening of the right.
In Resor v. Mouton,82 an automobile and a truck collided,
causing also damage to a nearby building. The automobile driver
sued the truck driver. The building owner sought to intervene.
His intervention was dismissed, upon the ground that he had
no interest in the automobile driver's recovery of damages and
thus did not seek to enforce a right related to or connected
with this demand. In so holding, the court narrowed the meaning of the new statutory test permitting intervention (a) "To
enforce a right related to or connected with the object of the
pending action," by (b) "(1) Joining with plaintiff in demanding the same or similar relief against the defendant; (2) Unit77. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1154; Patten v. Acy Pipeline Constructors, Inc.,
200 So.2d 684 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
78. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 2.9, 4.7, 4.8 (1965). 1 J.MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 8.27 (2d ed. 1967).
79. Fontana v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 173 So.2d 284 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1965). The opinion was authored by the present writer, who upon reflection
confesses error. Although the party relying upon "sudden emergency" may have
the burden of proving it to exculpate himself from fault, this does necessitate
classifying it as an affirmative defense which must be pleaded in order to be considered, for the reasons so well stated by Judge Regan in Bautista v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 201 So.2d 122 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
80. Bautista v. Maryland Cas. Co., 201 So.2d 122 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
81. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts, 1960-61-Civil Procedure,
22 LA. L. REv. 371-74 (1962) ; LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1091, comment (c).
82. 200 So.2d 308 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
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ing with defendant in resisting the plaintiff's demand; or (3)
Opposing both plaintiff and defendant. 8 3 In the cited suit, the
factual connexity of the intervenor's right with the object of
the plaintiff's demand satisfied the primary functional purpose of the connexity (or a) requirement, which is to avoid
engrafting unrelated claims onto the principal actions, while
nevertheless permitting intervention in the interests of judicial
efficiency and justice so as to avoid a multiplicity of actions,
with possible varying results, arising out of the same set of
facts. The building owner's demand for damages arising out
of the same accident satisfied the second (or b) part of the
test, which is to the effect that the intervenor's interest should
be similar to that of either party or opposed to both with regard
to the connected right he seeks to enforce.
Later in the court year, the same circuit indicated that an
employer could not intervene in a tort suit by its employee
against a third party to recovery property damage, although
recognizing that, under the terms of the workmen's compensation act, the employer was entitled to intervene to recover from
the alleged tortfeasor the personal injury compensation benefits
paid to the employee.8 4 This hypertechnical approach likewise
flouts the intent of the broadened intervention permitted by the
1960 Code. The same circuit had, however, recognized the
85
broadening of intervention in a decision rendered last year.
Just after the period under review, another circuit reached a
result directly contrary to the two cases above discussed, noting
its own view that the former circuit's decisions were erroneously decided. 86
OTHER TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

Discovery
The increasing importance of discovery is indicated by eight
appellate decisions. Of these, perhaps The Advertiser v. Tubbs 87
is most significant. There, a party was awarded attorney's
fees caused him through the opposing party's failure to answer
written interrogatories. Such opposing party's appeal from
this award was dismissed, with the court indicating that the
83. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1091.
84. Klotz v. Nola Cabs, Inc., 209 So.2d 158 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
85. Boyd v. Donelon, 193 So.2d 291 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967), writs refused,
250 La. 366, 195 So.2d 643 (1967).
86. Bellow v. New York Fire & Marine Underwriters, Inc., Docket No. 2456
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
87. 199 So.2d 426 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).

19691

WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1967-1968

287

award of discovery penalties is immediately executory and unappealable, reviewable only by supervisory writs. Another decision held that a physician's deposition was properly excluded
from a jury trial,"" because the witness himself was not shown
to have been unavailable for trial.8 9 (The reason was that the
service of the subpoena for trial was defective, since upon the
physician's secretary instead of upon him personally or through
domiciliary service.) One of the decisions pointed out that discovery depositions are not included within the services of procedures available to pauper parties without the prepayment
of fees.9 0
Jury Trials
Another group of eight appeals involved issues relating to
jury trials, attesting to the growing use in Louisiana civil
cases of this mode of trial. A statute prohibits the jury trial
of any suit against the state or other public body. 91 What happens when a jury trial is requested in a jury-triable action
against another party properly cumulated with a demand
against the state? The intermediate courts divided. The First
Circuit held that the effect of the statute was to require denial
of jury trial as to all defendants joined. 92 The Second Circuit
held that the joinder of the governmental body as codefendant
did not deprive the plaintiff of his right to trial by jury of
the suit against the other defendants 3 The Third Circuit, agreeing with the Second Circuit, held for a consolidated trial
against all defendants, including the state, with the trial judge
alone deciding the demands against the exempted governmental
bodies and the trial jury deciding the other demands. 94 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the only one of these cases in
which writs of review were sought, 95 so resolution of this conflict
may be expected.
The Code provides that a party desiring it must demand a
trial by jury within a given delay. 96 If trial by jury is ordered,
another statute requires that, where there be no venire of jurors,
88. Warrington v. Employers Group Ins. Cos., 207 So.2d 207 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1968).
89. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1428(3).
90. Pickney v. Sandoz, 200 So.2d 787 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
91. LA. R.S. 13:5104 (1950), as added by La. Acts. 1960, No. 27, § 4).
92. A'bercrombie v. Gilfoil, 205 So.2d 461 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
93. Jobe v. Hodge, 207 So.2d 912 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
94. Watson v. Hartford Indem. Co., 214 So.2d 395 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
95. Jobe v. Hodge, 251 La. 1079, 208 So.2d 536 (1968).
96. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1732.
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a party must apply for an order for the jury commission to meet
and select one.9 7 The plaintiffs, who had prayed for a jury trial,
were held to have waived their right to it by not making their
motion for a "venire facias" until eight calendar days before
trial, at a time when insufficient time was available to complete
the procedures for selecting and summonsing the prospective jurors. 98 Another court held that when a party does apply timely
for a jury, he cannot withdraw his request without the consent
of the opposing parties, if the time has elapsed for them to demand a jury; otherwise the former party's unilateral withdrawal would deprive his opponents of their own right to trial by
jury.9
Miscellaneous
Article 532 of the 1960 Code permits a Louisiana court to
stay a suit, if previously another with the requisite identity has
been brought in a foreign jurisdiction. The foreign suit situation
to to be distinguished from that governed by Article 531, when
both suits are brought in Louisiana state courts. In the latter
case, by timely filing of the declinatory objection, the opposing
party is entitled to have the second action dismissed. 100 However,
the former (or foreign suit) objection is dilatory in nature,
merely retarding (staying) the progress of the action;101 it is
therefore not waived by a general appearance, as is a declinatory objection.' 0 2 During the period under review, Article 532
received its first application by our Supreme Court. In Trans8
America Ins. Co. v. Whitney National Banky1
the Supreme
Court granted a supervisory writ and stayed the Louisiana action. The earlier suit had been brought in a federal court in New
Jersey. the high court noted that the witnesses could be heard
with more convenience and less expense in the New Jersey suit,
and that the legal question at issue did not involve any important question of Louisiana law.
Article 561 regulates the dismissal of actions for failure to
97. LA. R.S. 13:3050 (1960).
98. Scott v. Hardware Mut. Ins., 207 So.2d 817 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
99. Huntsberry v. Millers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 199 So.2d 196 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1967).
100. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 925, 932; cf. id. art. 531. Of course, if the plaintiff dismisses the suit first filed in the other jurisdiction, he may remove the
grounds of the objection to the second suit and thus save it from dismissal. Id.
art. 932.
101. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 923; Reid v. Crane Bros., 134 So.2d 917 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1961).
102. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 925.
103. 251 La. 800, 206 So.2d 500 (1968).
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take steps to prosecute or defend for five years. The revision
comment to the article indicates, however, that the dismissal of
a suit may be resisted by proof that the failure to prosecute was
caused by circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control. During
the year under review, in Semel v. Green04 the intermediate
court held that a 1960 petition for executory process should not
be dismissed as abandoned, because a 1960 preliminary injunction obtained by the defendant had prohibited the plaintiff from
proceeding further. Nearly six years later, the original plaintiff
had moved to dismiss the injunction proceedings for five years
non-prosecution. The trial court had dismissed as abandoned not
only these injunction proceedings, but also (on its own motion)
the executory foreclosure proceedings which had been instituted
by the plaintiff. The intermediate court reversed the dismissal
of the plaintiff's action for executory process, excusing the plaintiff's inaction because he had been enjoined from proceeding
further. Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the intermediate decision and reinstated the trial court's dismissal. 10 5
The decision stated that the plaintiff had failed to take steps in
the prosecution of his claim by not securing dissolution of the
preliminary injunction either by fixing it for trial on the merits
or else by appealing it. Ordinarily, a party enjoined from proceeding further should be exempted from the dismissal of a suit
for abandonment, since the failure to prosecute is due to circumstances he cannot readily control. The high court's holding, however, is probably correct within its context of executory proceedings to foreclose a mortgage. Such an action is initiated by filing
the petition with the appropriate showing °6 and securing an order for seizure and sale.107 The only method by which a defendant may raise a defense or procedural objection is through an
injunction (as here) or by a suspensive appeal.108 Under these
circumstances the preliminary injunction sought by the defendant was in the nature of the exception or answer filed by a defendant in ordinary proceedings. Thus, to prosecute further his
executory proceedings it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to secure the dismissal or trial of the defense thus asserted. The Supreme Court opinion, incidentally, reiterates that Article 561's
abandonment provisions are self-operative, even without a party
moving for dismissal. The high court upheld the trial court's dis104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

202 So.2d 417 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
Semel v. Green, 252 La. 386, 211 So.2d 300 (1968).
LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 2634-2637.
LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2638.
LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2642.
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missal on its own motion of the foreclosure proceedings as
abandoned.
In Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Fruge,10 9 the Supreme
Court required the immediate trial during the summer recess of
expropriation suits, in accord with a statutory provision, in the
absence of any showing that dates were not available to try the
cases. In Sanders v. Hebert,11° the plaintiff's action for damages
was dismissed, but judgment was rendered upon a reconventional demand in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the dismis-

sal of the principal demand was affirmed, but the judgment on
the reconventional demand was annulled because no preliminary
default had been taken or answer filed prior to trial. The ruling
overlooked the principle that the requirement of answer or default is waived where a litigant appears and participates in the
112
trial without objection.11 In Blanchard v. Blanchard,
the de-

fendant had formally requested notice of trial as provided by Article 1572 of the 1960 Code. She was therefore entitled to receive
written notice at least ten days before the trial date. A judgment

rendered against her was properly annulled, where the requisite
notice was not sent and where she neither appeared nor was
represented at a hearing which resulted in adverse judgment.
(The court noted, incidentally, that her former counsel's request by simple letter for such notice was sufficient in form,
rejecting the contention that the request should have been by
motion or in compliance with other formality.) In Consolidated
Loan, Inc. v. Guercio"l 3 by way of dicta the court erroneously
implied that valid domiciliary service could be made upon a wife
living separate and apart from her husband due to a marital
dispute. For many purposes, the wife's domicile may indeed be
that of her husband, when there is no judicial separation. However, the code article provides for domiciliary service at the
place where the person is actually living, by leaving process with
109. Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Frug6, 250 La. 1035, 201 So.2d 655
(1967).
110. 209 So.2d 62 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
111. Ducote v. Ducote, 183 La. 886, 165 So. 133 (1936) ; Lalumia v. Lalumia,
115 So.2d 883 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1959). Cf. Mire v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of New York,
177 So.2d 588 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965). See also LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1154,
which provides that issues tried by actual or implied consent should be considered
and decided by the court.
112. 204 So.2d 406 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967).
113. 200 So.2d 717 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
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a member of his household. 114 The functional reason for permitting such substituted service is that under such conditions it is
reasonably calculated to give actual notice.'15 It is doubtful that
constructive service upon a husband living separate and apart
from his wife due to a marital dispute can be viewed as assuring
her of adequate notice. 116 At any rate, such domiciliary service
upon the separated wife is not made, as required by the code
article, at her "dwelling house or usual place of abode," i.e., at
her actual (not theoretical) residence.
Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co." 7 contains an erroneous ruling with regard to declaratory judgments susceptible
of mischievous misuse. Certain landowners sued the mineral
lessee and other mineral owners to cancel a lease. With its answer, the mineral lessee filed a reconventional demand for a
declaratory judgment to interpret its rights under the lease. In
connection with this demand for a declaratory judgment, it
sought to join the attorneys and a geologist with whom the landowners had executed a contingency fee agreement. Acknowledging that these other parties were neither indispensable'" nor
necessary, 1 9 the reconvenor requested their joinder under Article 1880. This provides that "all persons shall be made parties
who have or claim any interest which would be affected" by a
declaratory judgment sought. The trial court sustained these
parties' exceptions and dismissed them from the suit. A majority
114. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1235 provides for domiciliary service, at the
"dwelling house or usual place of abode," not at the domicile. The phrase is
directly taken from FED. R. CIv. P. r. 4(d) (1) (1938). According to federal interpretations, the ordinary meaning of the phrase is the place where the party is
actually living (except for temporary absences) at the time the service is made.
2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 4.11 [1] (2d ed. 1967).
115. Cf. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.3 (1965).

116. An early case holds to the contrary Dugat v. Markham, 2 La. 29 (1830).
At the time of decision, however, domiciliary service could be made by leaving
copies "at the usual place of domicile or residence." (Emphasis added.). La. Code

of Practice art. 189 (1825). It is interesting to note that, nevertheless, the judgment against the separated wife was annulled, on the ground that her husband's
pleading filed on her behalf could not be viewed as properly designed to defend
her interests.

117. 208 So.2d 699 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). This was an appeal from a trial
court judgment sustaining exceptions urging misjoinder filed by these parties.
The judgment denying joinder is interlocutory, since it did not determine the
merits. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1841. Only interlocutory judgments causing irreparable injury are appealable. Id. art. 2083. Generally, judgments overruling
exceptions are regarded as nonappealable interlocutory judgments. Voisin v. Luke,
203 So.2d 916 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967) ; Lounsberry v. Hoffpauir, 199 So.2d 553
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1967) ; Sonnier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 So.2d 694 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1967). See also Neal v. Hall, 28 So.2d 131 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946) (judgment sustaining exception of misjoinder of parties is unappealable). However, the
question was not raised in the instant appeal.
118. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 641.

119. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 642.
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of the appellate court reversed and required joinder, because of
certain provisions in the contingency fee contract relating to the
option of these parties to purchase the landowner's interest, if
the latter wished to accept a compromise (if one was offered)
which their attorneys and geologist considered undesirable.
Article 1880 incorporates almost verbatim Section 11 of the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. 2 0° Apparently, no effort
was made to consult the interpretations of other jurisdictions
adopting this uniform act, although Article 1883 directs judicial
interpretation of these code articles "to effectuate their general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact
them, and to harmonize, as far as possible, with federal laws
and regulations on the subject of declaratory judgments and decrees." Had this been done, probably joinder would not have
been required, since the general purpose of the provision is to
avoid multiplicity of actions for the same considerations governing compulsory joinder of indispensable or necessary parties.1 21 The attorneys and geologist had interests merely derivative from those of the landowners, which would have been conclusively adjudicated by any judgment rendered in the reconventional demand asserted against the latter. As in In re Con22
gregation of St. Rita Roman Catholic,1
compulsory joinder
should have been denied because it would serve no purpose.
Since the intermediate ruling remanded the case to the trial
court, the Supreme Court refused to review it as merely interlocutory.' 23
PROCEEDINGS IN APPELLATE COURTS
A trio of decisions by the Supreme Court demonstrates its
disfavor of the dismissal of appeals on technical procedural
grounds. In Kirby-Natus Corp. v. Campbell,124 it reinstated an
appeal. The intermediate court had dismissed it because the
pleadings had inadvertently described the judgment appealed
120. See 9 U.L.A. 3 (1965) ; LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 1871-1883 (regulating
Louisiana declaratory judgments, closely parallel the provisions of this uniform act).
121. Annots., Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, § 11, 9 U.L.A. 351 (1965).
The Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1964), does not have
a provision relating to parties, although the uniform act is explicitly declared to
afford guidance to the scope and function of the federal act. FED. I. Civ. P. r.
57, committee note (1937) ; 6A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 57:01, 57:02 (2d
ed. 1967). The federal interpretations apply to actions for declaratory judgments
the same necessary-and indispensable-party theories as the other actions. Id. § 57.25.
122. 130 So.2d 425 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961). The defendant sought to require
the plaintiffs to join all neighboring owners, chiefly (apparently, as here) as a
harassing tactic.
123. Writs were denied, with the notation: "The judgment is not final." 252
La. 257, 210 So.2d 504 (1968).
124. 250 La. 868, 199 So.2d 904 (1967).
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from as rendered on the date of the denial of the new trial
(rather than on the earlier date of rendition of the final judgment itself). The high court held that this clerical inadvertency
did not deprive the appellant of the right to appeal from the
final judgment, as so obviously intended by his pleadings as a
whole. In Favrot v. Favrot,12 the record had been filed timely
in the intermediate court, which nevertheless dismissed the appeal because the transcript of testimony was lacking (since the
appellant had not paid for it). In reversing the dismissal, the
Supreme Court pointed that this type of non-jurisdictional
irregularity cannot be the basis of an appeal's dismissal unless
the appellee complains of it within the three-day period provided by Article 2161. In Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Baillio,"26 the;
high court again reversed the dismissal for an appeal where
there was merely an inadvertency in date in the motion applying
for it. It further held that an appellant's failure to pay the costs
of the appeal at least three days before the return day 27 cannot
be availed of as a ground for its dismissal, if the record is in
fact lodged in the appellate court on or before the return day.
The court held that the failure to pay the costs timely then "'becomes moot, since the purpose of the article is simply to assist
the trial clerk to receive such fees and costs in time to file the
record in the appellate court by the return date.' "1128
A cluster of cases during the period concerned the right of
an indigent party to appeal without the prepayment of costs or
fees or furnishing bond for them.2 9 A party who has secured
an order permitting him to litigate in forma pauperis is enti18 0
tled to a devolutive appeal without furnishing an appeal bond.
Accordingly, when the party has secured such order, his devolutive appeal is perfected immediately upon the trial court's granting the usual order of appeal.13' Once an order to litigate in
forma pauperis has been obtained, no special order need be obtained to dispense with the bond for the appeal. A party may
apply at any stage of the proceedings for the privilege to continue the case as an indigent, even after judgment on the merits
2 2
against him.
125. 252 La. 192, 210 So.2d 316 (1968).
126. 252 La. 181, 210 So.2d 312 (1968).
127. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2126.
128. 252 La. 181, 191, 210 So.2d 312, 315 (1968).
129. The privilege of litigating in forma pauperis is regulated by LA. CODE
Crv. P. arts. 5181-5188.
130. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 5185(4).
131. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2088.
132. Malveaux v. Buller, 131 So.2d 571 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
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The party is then exempted from prepayment of or furnishing bond for costs accruing after the order granting him leave
to proceed as a pauper. 3 Two appeals of indigents were dismissed this term because they did not apply for the order to
litigate in forma pauperis until after the delay for a devolutive
appeal had expired.13 In another, an indigent wife was granted
leave by the appellate court to continue her appeal, where she had
filed her bond timely to perfect the appeal, but was not unable
to pay for further costs of preparation of the transcript. 3 5 A
fourth decision held that the clerk of court was required to pay
the expense of transporting the record to the appellate court
($4.00), rejecting the clerk of court's contention that this forced
him to make a cash outlay in violation of one of the limitations
of the privilege.'36
The most interesting decision of this group is Evans v. Livingston People's Gas Corp."37 There, on the final day of the delay, the plaintiff obtained an ex parte order permitting him to
appeal devolutively from the dismissal of his suit. About a week
later, the appellees secured an order remanding the appeal to
the district court for the limited purpose of permitting them to
contest the plaintiff's indigency. The defendants successfully
did so. The trial court rescinded its order permitting the plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, and it set a devolutive appeal
bond in the amount of $250. The plaintiff did not furnish this
devolutive appeal bond until twelve judicial days after this order. The appellees then moved to dismiss the appeal as not perfected timely, since the plaintiff was not entitled to appeal without bond and since the bond had not been filed by the last day
of the ninety-day delay for a devolutive appeal. (It was on this
day that the plaintiff had secured his order permitting him to
continue in forma pauperis.) In its excellent decision discussing
the pertinent code provisions, the court of appeal rejected this
contention. Since the litigant had obtained the order to proceed
as a pauper at the time he took his appeal, it was timely perfected under the literal provisions of Articles 2087 and 2088.
(When permission to litigate as an indigent is granted, the
133. Sonnier v. United States Cas. Co., 150 So.2d 782 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
134. Johnson v. Patout, 199 So.2d 199 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967) ; Wilkerson v.
Luneau, 198 So.2d 183 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
.35. 201 So.2d 871 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
136. State v. Blakeman, 207 So.2d 860 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
137. 205 So.2d 466 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
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party is entitled to all of the privileges of doing so "until this
order is rescinded.") "38
Nevertheless, the appeal was dismissed, because the devolutive appeal bond was not timely filed within four days after trial
court's determination that the appellant was not entitled to appeal without bond. The court of appeal properly found that,
when the trial court rescinded the order to proceed in forma
pauperis and then set a devolutive appeal bond at $250, the appropriate statutory regulation is provided by those code articles
which relate to testing the insufficiency or invalidity of the security required in judicial proceedings, 1 9 especially that provision 140 requiring a litigant to furnish a corrected security within four judicial days after a judgment decrees his previous security insufficient. Since the plaintiff did not furnish the corrected security within four days after the judgment rescinding
his right to proceed without bond, the corrected bond he filed
twelve days after the order did not save his appeal.
Supervisory Jurisdiction
The state appellate courts are vested with supervisory jurisdiction. 141 This plenary power is completely discretionary. 14 2 The
Supreme Court will not exercise its own supervisory powers in
the absence of a prior unsuccessful resort to the appropriate intermediate court, if any. Prior to 1965, orders of the intermediate courts under their supervisory jurisdiction were thought
to be executory immediately, with the adversely affected party
not having as of right the usual appellate delays to apply for a
rehearing (fourteen days) 43 and thereafter of applying to the
high court for certiorari (thirty days) .144 Nevertheless, in certain unarticulated decisions, the Supreme Court held to the contrary, whereupon the intermediate courts revised their rules to
provide that, after a supervisory writ is granted, the judgment
of the intermediate court did not become final and executory
until after expiration of the same delays as if the case had been
138. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 5185.
139. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 5121-5127.
140. LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 5124.
141. LA. CONST. art. 7, § § 10, 27, as amended by La. Acts. 1958, No. 561.
142. See, e.g., State v. Democratic State Central Committee, 229 La. 549,
86 So.2d 189 (1956), 229 La. 556, 86 So.2d 192 (1956) ; Tate, Supervisory Powers
of the Louisiana Courts of Appeal, 38 T-L. L. REv. 429 (1964) ; Comment, 34
TuL L. Rnv. 165 (1959). These citations will not be repeated in support of general statements in the text.
143. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2166.
144. Id. art. 2167.
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decided on appeal. 145 The high court's rulings deprived the intermediate courts of power to exercise their supervisory powers effectively in many situations, as was demonstrated in Michigan
Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Frug6.146 There, the realtors sought
review of the trial court's refusal to hear expropriation cases, a
refusal which the Supreme Court subsequently held to be unjustified.147 The intermediate court felt unable to intervene, because the time for any trial to be ordered in the lower court
would have been long past before any judgment rendered by the
court of appeal could become executory, because of the appellate
delays now required to be granted.
A typical situation for exercise of supervisory powers is
where, although the law does not afford a right of appeal, the
interests of justice point toward immediate review of a trial
ruling which may cause an irremediable change of position.4 s
For this reason, the court may have taken too restricted a review of its powers, when it vacated a supervisory writ previously granted in Yancey v. Womack.14 In that case, the writ
had been granted in an eviction proceedings, in which a suspensive appeal does not ordinarily lie.5 0 The appellate court recalled its writ, observing that "the supervisory jurisdiction of
this court is not to be utilized as a substitute for the ordinary
appellate process."' 51 Of course, ordinarily supervisory writs
should not be exercised where the issue can be decided by appeal. 152 However, examination through exercise of the discretionary supervisory powers is always appropriate to prevent
what the appellate court may feel to be a real possibility of detriment through an erroneous trial ruling, even though there be
no right of suspensive appeal. "I
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

Limitations of space prevent detailed discussion of the thirteen appellate decisions arising out of the enforcement of judg145. Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal, Rule XII, § 7 (1963), as
amended on December 15, 1965. The history is set forth, with citation of decisions,
in the opinion cited at note 146 infra.
146. 201 So.2d 672 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
147. 250 La. 1035, 201 So.2d 655 (1967).
148. See, e.g., Broussard v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 210 So.2d 411 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1968) ;Ellender v. Sabel, 193 So.2d 84 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
149. 203 So.2d 846 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
150. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4735.
151. 203 So.2d 846-47 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
152. See, e.g., Stevens v. Patterson Menhaden Corp., 191 So.2d 692 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1966).
153. Waggoner v. Grant Parish Police Jury, 198 La. 798, 4 So.2d 833 (1941).
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ments. Most of them do, however, represent points of practical
concern. For instance, two concern execution sales involving
federal tax lien questions, 5 4 a matter of increasing relevance.
Again, the purchaser at a sheriff's sale takes the risk that the
property he purchases is subject to a superior lien which he
may be called upon to pay 1 55 or is owned by a third person.156 A
seizing judgment creditor was held liable to the sheriff for over
two thousand dollars of storage charges by a local contractor
appointed as keeper by the sheriff. 57 The decision points out
that Article 329 authorizes the taxation as court costs of "all
necessary" expenses for the protection of the property seized.
A judgment creditor may seize and sell the interests of his
debtor in a pending lawsuit.15 8 If this is done, an attorney handling the claim for the debtor may lose his right to receive a
contingency fee from the eventual recovery, unless he has properly recorded his contract as required by pertinent statute.5 9
In most of the decisions, summary proceedings were used to
determine priority of liens, exemption of property, and other
disputes between the judgment creditor, the judgment debtor, or
the purchaser arising out of the execution sale. This expeditious
procedure is often used, without objection, in order to determine
such questions incidental to the original litigation, rather than
to require a new ordinary action to be filed, with the delays
60
consequent upon this additional litigation. In Grayson v. Gray,1
the Second Circuit held that Article 2592 (1) authorizes this mode
of procedure to dispose of such disputes as being "an incidental
question arising in the course of litigation." The court cited
earlier decisions such as Britt v. Merritt,161 where this procedure was followed to determine the efficacy or effect of a
writ of fieri facias. Nevertheless, in X-L Fin. Co. v. Civil,162 the
First Circuit held that whether a judgment had been discharged
in bankruptcy was not an incidental question arising in the
course of litigation. Accordingly, the court of appeal dismissed
the rule against the debtor brought by the creditor for such purpose, relegating the creditor to sue under ordinary process to
154.
Housing
155.
1967).
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Fortier v. Fortier, 200 So.2d 901 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967) ; Miller v.
Authority of New Orleans, 200 So.2d 704 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. DeBrueys, 200 So.2d 916 (La. App. 1st Cir.

Cf. Martino v. Fairburn, 206 So.2d 318 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
Pitre v. Talley, 205 So.2d 818 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
LA. R.S. 13:3864-3868 (1950).
Selly v. Watson, 210 So.2d 113 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
207 So.2d 916 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
56 So.2d 766 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1952).
200 So.2d 326 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
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determine whether the judgment he secured had been discharged, or else to execute his writ of fieri facias, at the risk of
an action against him for damages arising out of wrongful seizure. In the writer's view, the code article does not require so restrictive an interpretation, and the Second Circuit's is the better
view.
EXECUTORY PROCEEDINGS

In Tapp v. Guaranty Fin. Co.,163 the First Circuit in 1963
held that a debtor against whom a deficiency judgment is sought
may attack the validity of the prior sale under executory process. Dean McMahon believed the decision to be unsound and to
pose a serious threat to the usefulness of executory process, since
it might adversely affect the stability of judicial sales.16 4 For
these reasons, in White Motor Co. v. Piggy Bak Cartage
Corp.,1 65 the Fourth Circuit during the year held a debtor could
not defend against a deficiency judgment on the contention that
the sale under executory process was invalid, not having enjoined the sale or taken a suspensive appeal from the order decreeing it. Later in the reviewed year, however, the Supreme
Court provided a sensible clarification of this conflict in the jurisprudence. In League Central Credit Union v. Montgomery, 66 it reversed a previous decision of the Fourth Circuit to the
same effect as White Motor Co. The high court dismissed the
mortgagee's claim for a deficiency judgment, upholding the
debtor's defense that the prior sale under executory proceedings
was invalid. The court pointed out that the claim for a deficiency
judgment was founded upon this prior sale, the validity of which
was therefore at issue.
In expressly approving Tapp and expressly disapproving
the White Motor Co., the Supreme Court pointed out that the
disallowance of a deficiency judgment because of defects in the
sale does not affect the validity of the title of a third person who
purchases at the judicial sale nor jeopardize such purchaser's
possession, at least in the absence of fraud upon the debtor or
lack of notice to him of the sale. Thus, where a defendant in executory proceedings has failed to secure an injunction or to perfect a suspensive appeal to prevent the sale, this defendant can163. 158 So.2d 228 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
164. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Court for the 1963-64 Term-Civil
Procedure, 25 LA. REV. 450 (1965). See also Note, 24 LA. REV. 894 (1964).
165. 202 So.2d 294 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967) writs refused, 251 La. 390, 204
So.2d 574 (1967).
166. League Central Credit Union v. Montgomery, 251 La. 971, 207 So.2d
762 (1968). The case is excellently noted at 29 LA. REV. 181, 191 (1968), infra.
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not, as against a third person, invalidate the sale for technical
procedural defects which, by timely proper objection, could have
averted the sale. On the other hand, as League Central holds, the
debtor's failure at the time to take steps to prevent the loss of
property he may have been unable to pay for anyway, does not
bar him from a defense based upon the impropriety of the sale
when, for the first time, the quite different question is presented of his personal liability for a money judgment beyond the
value of the property. The League Central Credit Union decision
thus provides a rule which protects debtors against abuse
through executory process, without at the same time endangering the stability of titles gained by third persons through judicial sales resulting from executory proceedings.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY
The broad pre-trial discovery procedures of the Federal
Rules' have not been adopted by most states. Stressing the fact
that full pre-trial discovery was considered and rejected when
the 1966 Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure was drafted, the
Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Hunter2 reaffirmed the
prior Louisiana rule that a defendant is entitled to pre-trial
inspection of his written confession, but refused to broaden the
defendant's right to a full discovery of evidence in possession of
the district attorney. Two 1967-68 decisions further illustrate
the rule that the defendant does not have a right to inspect the
state's evidence in advance of trial. State v. Cardinale3 reiterated
the "firmly established" rule that a defendant is not entitled to
a pre-trial inspection of written confessions of co-defendants,
written statements of witnesses,4 or police reports in the possession of the district attorney.
In State v. Fox5 the Supreme Court applied a "well-settled
rule" that the state is not required to furnish the defendant
with a list of its witnesses. Denial of general discovery rights
to defense counsel is not an arbitrary rule. If discovery were
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16.
2. 250 La. 295, 195 So.2d 273 (1967), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967 Term-Criminal Procedure, 28 LA. L.
REV. 427 (1968).
3. 251 La. 827, 206 So. 2d 510 (1968).
4. Citing numerous cases, id. at 832, 206 So.2d at 512.
5. 251 La. 464, 205 So.2d 42 (1967).

